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Abstract
We investigate, through a kinetic-exchange model, the impact that
an external field, like advertising and propaganda, has on opinion
dynamics. We address the situations where two opposite alternatives
can be selected but the possibility of indecision also exists. In this
model, individuals influence each other through pairwise interactions,
which can be of agreement or disagreement, and there are also external
fields that can skew decision making. Two parameters are used to
model the interactions with the field: one measures the sensitivity of
the individuals to be influenced, another quantifies in which direction.
We study this model in a fully connected social network scenario,
by means of numerical simulations of the kinetic exchange dynamics
and analytical results derived from the mean-field rate equations. We
show how the external bias gives rise to imperfect bifurcations, and
cusp catastrophes, allowing abrupt changes and hysteresis depending
on the level of disagreement in interpersonal interactions and on the
strength of the external influence.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, kinetic exchange, catastrophe
1 Introduction
Many models of opinion dynamics, mainly those coming from the statistical
physicist’s community, address self-organization aspects [1]. In these cases,
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the purpose is to unveil how the interpersonal interactions, by themselves,
contribute to shape public opinion. Moreover, assessing the conditions for the
emergence of self-organized structures is very important per se since it helps
to understand mechanisms that can be present in other complex systems.
Despite in a social group collective states, like consensus or polarization, can
emerge from the interactions amongst individuals, without the need of any
external control [2], advertising and propaganda are always present, taking
advantage of a variety of media, from conventional (such a television, radio,
newspapers, outdoors, etc.) to modern robots and influencers in the internet.
Therefore, their global impact and interplay with the internal interactions,
which can promote the alignment to either one or other opinion [3], is another
important social phenomenon to be studied. But, as far as we know, rela-
tively few works in the vast literature on opinion dynamics address this issue.
Among them let us mention a study, based on real data of mobile’s oligopoly
market, on how advertising influences the choice of a given operator [4]. In
that case, a critical behavior depending on the level of advertising is ob-
served. In another paper, the effect of mass media is investigated through a
variant of Sznajd model [5], where individuals follow an external field with
certain probability. Shortening of relaxation times and suppression of the
order-disorder phase transition for sufficiently strong field is observed, facili-
tating consensus, as expected. But many questions arise, for instance which
is the interplay of contrarian and undecided people with the field, or which
is the impact of opposite fields.
In the present work, we focus on a binary scenario where people have two
opposite choices (e.g., “for” or “against” a controversial issue, “yes” or “no”
in a referendum, etc.) and indecision can also happen. The inclusion of the
undecided state is important since it is known to play a role in the route to
consensus [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. We consider that the individual opinions
evolve due to interactions among people that exchange their thoughts and
influence each other, both positively or negatively, and also due to external
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voices driving the dynamics towards one of the alternatives. This is a scenario
found in many real situations, where the influence of biased information
may be crucial, mainly nowadays, with high ease for fast and widespread
dissemination. We investigate this question by means of a model where
opinions evolve through kinetic exchanges. The details of the model are
defined in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we present the outcomes of simulations in
fully connected networks, interpreted in terms of mean-field rate equations.
Remarks about the results of this model are discussed in Sec. 4.
2 Model
We consider an opinion formation model based on kinetic exchange rules of
interaction [14, 7, 8, 9, 6]. Each individual i, in a population of size N ,
possesses an opinion oi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, which indicates whether i has a positive
or negative position about the topic under discussion (i.e., oi = ±1), or an
undecided (neutral) attitude (oi = 0).
Opinions are updated via Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. At each it-
eration, two agents are randomly sorted and their opinions are updated.
Updating is governed by kinetic exchange and by the influence of an external
contribution that promotes alignment to one of the alternatives, according
to
oi(t+ 1)= oi(t) + µijoj(t) + Φi(t),
oj(t+ 1)= oj(t) + µjioi(t) + Φj(t),
(1)
where Φi represents the contribution of the external field to mold the opinion
of agent i and µij is the strength of the influence of agent j over i. More-
over, this influence can be either of agreement (positive) or disagreement
(negative). Negative interactions can be seen as a kind of contrarian behav-
ior [15, 16], which means that agent i tends to adopt the opposite opinion
of agent j (counter-imitation). If Eq. (1) yields higher (lower) values than 1
(−1), then the opinion is set to the corresponding extreme value 1 (−1).
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In the current setup, we consider that the coupling is an annealed random
variable, controlled by the parameter p according to
µij =


1, with probability 1− p,
−1, with probability p, (2)
where p represents the average fraction of negative interactions, that is, of
individuals which follow the contrarian behavior. Notice that in general
µij 6= µji, but this is irrelevant in the annealed version.
The external contribution acting in Eq. (1) is also an annealed random
variable, defined as
Φi =


1,
0, with probability
−1,
φω,
1− φ,
φ(1− ω).
(3)
The external influence can be turned off by setting φ = 0. In this case, it
is well-known that the system undergoes a non-equilibrium order-disorder
phase transition [8, 9], at the critical value of the fraction of negative in-
teractions pc = 0.25. When 0 < φ ≤ 1, the population is exposed and
it is sensitive to the external influence. Then, the parameter ω measures
the relative contribution of two opposite advertisement sources, favorable to
each available alternative. According to Eq. (3), the action of the external
fields is symmetric around ω = 0.5, under the transformation ω → 1 − ω,
fk → f−k, where fk is the fraction of individuals with opinion k. In particu-
lar, if ω = 0.5, both external fields contribute in the same measure, and the
system is perfectly symmetric with respect to the two opposite opinions. In
the extreme cases ω = 0 and ω = 1, a single external influence is present.
Due to this symmetry, we choose to analyze one of the intervals, namely
ω ∈ [0.5, 1], which corresponds to fields favoring opinion o = 1.
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3 Results
We run the Monte Carlo dynamics ruled by the algorithm defined by Eqs.
(1)-(3), in fully connected networks. In order to followed the evolution of
the collective state of the system, we measure the fractions fk of individuals
with opinion k = −1, 0, 1.
In Fig. 1, we illustrate the temporal evolution of the fractions of both
opinions, in the case φ = 0.05 and ω = 1 (recall, that, by Eq.(3), this setting
favors option o = 1), for two different levels of contrarian behavior. In both
cases, two initial values of (f1, f−1) are considered. We see that for the level of
contrarians p = 0.4, in the left panel, independently of the initial conditions,
(f1, f−1) evolves towards a state where the opinion favored by the field wins,
despite φ << 1. Differently, for a low level of contrarians (e.g., p = 0.1, in
the right panel), the final collective state depends on the initial condition
and even the opinion favored by the field can end up losing (squares). This
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Figure 1: Time evolution of fractions f1 (lilac) and f−1 (orange), for ω = 1,
φ = 0.05, and disagreement level: p = 0.4 (left) and p = 0.1 (right). In
each case, two initial conditions are considered: (f1, f−1)(t = 0) = (0.4,
0.2) (circles) and (0.2, 0.4) (squares), sorting 30 different configurations in a
network of size N = 1000. Dashed lines represent the mean-field calculation.
5
indicates the existence of multistability. Finite size fluctuations (N = 1000
in the example), can alter the evolution, making it proceed following the fate
of phase space points in other basin, as observed for one of the trajectories
in panel (b).
This portrait can be understood analytically. Considering that the dy-
namics occurs on the complete graph topology, we obtain the mean-field
equations for the transition rates of each opinion
df1
dt
= G1(f1, f−1, p, φ, ω), (4)
df
−1
dt
= G
−1(f1, f−1, p, φ, ω), (5)
where the functions G1 andG−1 and their derivation is given in the Appendix.
The dashed lines in Fig. 1 were obtained via numerical integration of Eqs.
(4) and (5), showing a complete agreement with the results of Monte Carlo
numerical simulations. The influence of initial conditions can be visualized
through the flux diagrams in Fig. 2, where the same two initial conditions of
Fig. 1 (red circles) are plotted, together with the fixed points (blue symbols).
In the left panel, all flux lines converge to a single stable fixed point, while
in the right panel, there are two basins of attraction, with initial conditions
evolving towards two distinct stable fixed points (blue circles).
In order to investigate how the full portrait is altered depending on the
intensity of the external field, we plot in Fig. 3 the stability diagrams for
different fixed values of φ. Solid (dashed) lines represent stable (physical)
solutions and dashed lines unstable ones. The bistability observed in Figs. 1
and 2 is associated to the existence of two branches in these bifurcation
diagrams.
For the case where φ = 0, there is a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation,
and two solutions with complementary values of f1 and f−1. This is in
accord with the continuous phase transition observed for the order parameter
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Flux diagram in the plane (f1, f−1), for the same parameters used
in Fig. 1. Red points highlight initial conditions and red lines the trajectories
toward the stable fixed points (blue circles). The blue square corresponds to
a saddle point in the separatrix between the two basins of attraction. Notice
that only the region 0 ≤ fk ≤ 1, for k = −1, 0, 1, is accessible.
|∆| = |f1 − f−1|, at the critical point pc = 0.25. Due to the symmetry, |∆|
vs p produces a single curve. For the disordered phase (∆ = 0, for p > pc),
f0 = 1/3 and in the ordered phase f0 = p/(1−p) [8] (also see Appendix, and
black line in the inset of Fig. 3(b)).
Differently, when a small field is switched on, the pitchfork branches de-
tach. (Hence, the continuous transition observed for φ = 0 is suppressed,
because the critical curve splits into two.) Despite the imperfect bifurcation
that arises for 0 < φ < φc = 0.5, the field may still be unable to produce
a winner, depending on the initial conditions. Only stronger fields (φ ≥ φc,
see inset of Fig. 3(a)) are capable of imposing a winner independently of the
initial configuration, since f
−1 present a single branch above that tipping
point.
Also notice, in the inset of Fig. 3(b), the behavior of the density of un-
decided people f0. In contrast to the case with no field, f0 has two branches
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagrams of f1 (left) and f−1 (right), as a function of p,
for fixed values of φ (indicated in the legend). Solid (dashed) lines correspond
to stable (unstable) fixed points. The inset in (a) highlights the region of
phase space where there is bistability. The inset in (b) shows corresponding
plots for f0.
below the tipping point pc(φ). Actually this is a consequence of the lack of
complementarity of f1 and f−1. For the states in the lower (upper) branch
of f0, the number of undecided people diminishes (increases) with increasing
field.
It is also worth observing the effect of the field for fixed values of p, which
means to consider a society with a given level of nonconformity. In Fig. 4,
we plot the bifurcation diagram for f1 as a function of φ (ω = 1) for several
values of p. From this point of view, bistability is possible if p is low enough.
In this case, if the system is in the lower branch, then, by increasing the
field φ above the tipping point, it will jump to the upper branch. Once in
the upper branch, it cannot come back to the lower one just by reverting
the change of the field, or even by completely turning off the field, except
by a strong finite-size fluctuation. Differently, a large enough proportion of
contrarians (p > 0.25) eliminates the lower branch of the steady solution for
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f1, making opinion o = 1 win, independently of the initial configuration of
the system. That is, contrarians make the field more effective, by muffling
the contribution of mutual interactions.
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagrams of f1 as a function of φ, for fixed values of
p indicated on the legend (ω = 1). The inset shows the corresponding plots
for f
−1.
Let us analyze now the case 0.5 ≤ ω < 1, where a contribution of an
opposite field appears. Recall that while φ controls the sensitivity to any
external field, ω is the relative strength of the field favorable to opinion
o = 1. Therefore, for ω = 0.5, both fields have the same presence in the
media, while as ω gradually goes to 1 (or 0), the field favorable to o = 1 (or
to -1) has the strongest impact.
Figure 5 shows the behavior of f1 as a function of p for several values of
φ, with ω = 0.6 (a) and ω = 0.5 (b). These plots must be compared to those
in Fig. 2(a), which corresponds to ω = 1. Notice, that decreasing ω from 1
to 0.5, allows bistability to occur for increasing values of φ and the diagrams
tend to a perfect pitchfork, which is attained at ω = 0.5 (equal strength of
both opposed fields), illustrated in Fig. 5(b).
For ω = 0.5, above the critical value, the system is disordered, in the
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagrams showing f1 vs. p for different values of φ (the
same used in Fig. 2), with ω = 0.6 (a) and ω = 0.5 (b). In (a) the inset
shows the stability diagrams in the plane p − φ. In the inset (b), the solid
line is given by Eq. (11) and the level of f1 = (1− f0)/2 independent of p in
the disordered phase is given by Eq. (10).
sense that both extreme opinions are balanced (f1 = f−1 = (1 − f0)/2),
where the undecided fraction f0 is given by Eq. (10). The exact expression
for pc(φ) plotted in the inset of Fig. 5(b) is derived in the Appendix. This
critical point decreases with φ. Hence, in comparison to the absence of fields
(φ = 0), when there are two balanced fields (ω = 0.5), lower values of p (low
counter-imitation) are enough to promote a disordered state where there is
no dominant opinion. Therefore, opposed fields have a disorganizing effect.
Moreover, the fraction of undecided people decreases as φ increases. The
continuous phase transition observed in this case, is suppressed if ω 6= 0.5.
Plots of f1 vs ω are presented in Fig. 6, for several values of φ. Parameter
ω changes the predominance of the fields, being balanced at ω = 0.5. Then,
around this value, the roles of o = 1 and o = −1 are inverted, as shown in
the inset of Fig. 6(a). When increasing ω from 0.5 to 1 (meaning increasing
predominance of the field associated to opinion o = 1), the system can even-
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tually jump to a distant fixed point, and recovery is not possible, even if the
dominant field is reversed, except when undergoing a large finite-size fluctu-
ation, configuring an irreversible transition with hysteresis. This is similar
to the hysteresis behavior observed by changing φ with ω = 1 in Fig. 4. A
full landscape of f1 vs φ ω for a fixed level of disagreement is depicted in
Fig. 6(b).
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram of f1 vs. ω for different values of φ (a), and vs
φ and ω (b). The change of regime (from bistable to monostable) occurs at
φ ≃ 0.566 Disagreement level is p = 0.1. The inset illustrates the symmetry
around ω = 0.5 under the transformations ω → 1− ω and fk → f−k.
4 Final remarks
We investigated the effects of external fields in a kinetic exchange opinion
dynamics, observing how interpersonal and global external influences drive
the collective dynamics. In the absence of external fields, when opinions are
taken by exchanges between peers, there is a pitchfork bifurcation at a critical
value pc = 0.25, signaling a continuous order/disorder transition. This kind
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of diagram also emerges when there are balanced external influences. When
an external bias is turned on, the pitchfork disconnects into two pieces as
depicted in Fig. 3. This has important implications concerning the fate of the
collective state when the social group is subject to external bias. An increase
of the field can produce an abrupt change of the winner alternative, which is
very difficult to be reversed even if the external field is suppressed, as shown
in Figs. 4 and 6. Therefore the external influence of the media can produce
the phenomenon known in nonlinear theory as catastrophe. It is noteworthy
that a similar picture was observed due to the presence of zealots [13], which
somehow act with their extremist attitude as a unilateral biased influence,
although of internal origin.
The level of disagreement in the population plays a role in moderating
the effect of the field, with its disorganizing role. But opposite fields are
disorganizing too.
Concerning indecision, the number of undecided people is reduced by the
biased driving, since this group is more sensitive to the effect of the field,
adopting more easily than an opponent the opinion favored by the field.
Then, an initially large number of people in the undecided state reinforces
the effect of the field. This is due to the role of the undecided in mediating
exchanges [9, 11, 12] and also to their larger susceptibility.
Finally let us note that, these results may give insights to understand
more complex situations where opinions co-evolve with other dynamics such
as epidemics [17], where the epidemic state can act as a (time variable) field
molding opinion dynamics.
A Derivation of the rate equations
We obtain the matrix of transition probabilities in which the element mr,s
is the probability of the change of state r → s, following a simple mean-
field approach. We consider all possible combinations in Eq. (1), taking into
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account that opinions oi, oj ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, couplings µij ∈ {−1, 1}, according
to Eq. (2), while the effective field can take values in {−1, 0, 1}, according to
Eq. (3). Then, we obtain
m1,1 = f1
(
f1(pφω + 1− p) + f0(φω + 1− φ) + f−1(p+ (1− p)φω)
)
,
m1,0 = f1
(
f1p(1− φ) + f0φ(1− ω) + f−1(1− p)(1− φ)
)
,
m1,−1 = f1
(
f1pφ(1− ω) + f−1(1− p)φ(1− ω)
)
,
m0,1 = f0
(
f1(1− p)(φω + 1− φ) + f0φω + f−1p(φω + 1− φ)
)
,
m0,0 = f0
(
f1(pφω + (1− p)φ(1− ω)) + f0(1− φ) + f−1((1− p)φω + pφ(1− ω))
)
,
m0,−1 = f0
(
f1p(1− φω) + f0φ(1− ω) + f−1(1− p)(1− φω)
)
,
m
−1,1 = f−1
(
f1(1− p)φω + f−1pφω
)
,
m
−1,0 = f−1
(
f1(1− p)(1− φ) + f0φω + f−1p(1− φ)
)
,
m
−1,−1 = f−1
(
f1(p+ (1− p)φ(1− ω)) + f0(1− φω) + f−1(pφ(1− ω) + 1− p)
)
.
Finally, considering that f0 = 1−f1−f−1, the equations for the evolution
of each density are
df1
dt
= m0,1 +m−1,1 −m1,0 −m1,−1 ≡ G1(f1, f−1, p, φ, ω), (6)
df
−1
dt
= m1,−1 +m0,−1 −m−1,1 −m−1,0 ≡ G−1(f1, f−1, p, φ, ω). (7)
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B Analytical results for ω = 0.5
The usual order parameter is defined as O = |f1 − f−1|. The evolution of
∆ = f1 − f−1, from Eqs. (6) and (7), when ω = 0.5, can be cast in the form
d∆
dt
=
(
df1
dt
− df−1
dt
)
= a∆ . (8)
where a = f0(1− p)(1− φ)− p.
In the steady state, it must be either ∆ = 0 (meaning a disordered state,
where opposite opinions balance) or a = 0 (meaning unbalance). Therefore,
in the ordered phase, the fraction of undecided people is
f0 =
p
(1− p)(1− φ) . (9)
In the disordered phase, ∆ = 0. Thus, setting f
−1 = f1 in the expression
df0/dt = 0, we obtain
f0 =
2(1− φ)−√1− φ2
3− 5φ , (10)
after discarding the unphysical solution. (At φ = 3/5, this expression must
be substituted by its limit value.) Notice that, f0 is independent of p. It
decreases with φ from 1/3 (when φ = 0) to 0 when (φ = 1).
The expressions given by Eqs. (9) and (10) must coincide at the critical
point, thus yielding
pc =
1− φ
3− φ+
√
(1 + φ)/(1− φ)
. (11)
This curve is plotted in the inset of Fig. 5. For φ = 0, the known value
f0 = 1/3 and pc = 1/4 are recovered. If φ = 1, then pc = 0.
Finally, we can obtain f1 for both phases. In the disordered phase, simply
f1 = (1 − f0)/2, where f0 is given by Eq. (10). For the ordered phase, one
14
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Figure 7: Fraction f1 vs. φ, for fixed values of p, using the analytical proce-
dure described in the text. In the disordered phase, the dark line highlights
that the result is independent of p, f1 = f−1 = (1− f0)/2.
can solve Eq. (4) analytically using f0 from Eq. (9). The behavior of f1 vs φ
is illustrated in Fig. 7.
It is noteworthy that there are two stable ordered solutions of f1. Mean-
while, f
−1 has the same solutions, assuming complementary values. Then,
we obtain |∆| ∼ |p− pc|β where β = 1/2, the typical mean field exponent for
continuous phase transition[18].
15
References
[1] Claudio Castellano, Santo Fortunato, and Vittorio Loreto. Statistical
physics of social dynamics. Reviews of modern physics, 81(2):591, 2009.
[2] Marlon Ramos, Jia Shao, Saulo DS Reis, Celia Anteneodo, Jos S An-
drade, Shlomo Havlin, and Hernn A Makse. How does public opinion
become extreme? Scientific reports, 5:10032, 2015.
[3] Emilio Ferrara, Onur Varol, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer, and
Alessandro Flammini. The rise of social bots. Communications of the
ACM, 59(7):96104, 2016.
[4] Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron, Rafae l Weron, and Maja W loszczowska. Out-
flow dynamics in modeling oligopoly markets: The case of the mobile
telecommunications market in poland. Journal of Statistical Mechanics:
Theory and Experiment, 2008(11):P11018, 2008.
[5] Nuno Crokidakis. Effects of mass media on opinion spreading in the
sznajd sociophysics model. Physica A: statistical mechanics and its ap-
plications, 391(4):17291734, 2012.
[6] Mehdi Lallouache, Anindya S Chakrabarti, Anirban Chakraborti, and
Bikas K Chakrabarti. Opinion formation in kinetic exchange mod-
els: Spontaneous symmetry-breaking transition. Physical Review E,
82(5):056112, 2010.
[7] Soumyajyoti Biswas. Mean-field solutions of kinetic-exchange opinion
models. Physical Review E, 84(5):056106, 2011.
[8] Soumyajyoti Biswas, Arnab Chatterjee, and Parongama Sen. Disorder
induced phase transition in kinetic models of opinion dynamics. Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 391(11):32573265, 2012.
16
[9] Nuno Crokidakis and Celia Anteneodo. Role of conviction in nonequi-
librium models of opinion formation. Physical Review E, 86(6):061127,
2012.
[10] Kristjen B Lundberg and B Keith Payne. Decisions among the unde-
cided: Implicit attitudes predict future voting behavior of undecided
voters. PloS one, 9(1):e85680, 2014.
[11] Pablo Balenzuela, Juan Pablo Pinasco, and Viktoriya Semeshenko. The
undecided have the key: interaction-driven opinion dynamics in a three
state model. PloS one, 10(10):e0139572, 2015.
[12] F Vazquez and S Redner. Ultimate fate of constrained voters. Journal
of Physics A: Mathematical and General, 37(35):8479, 2004.
[13] A Svenkeson and A Swami. Reaching consensus by allowing moments of
indecision. Scientific reports, 5:14839, 2015.
[14] Parongama Sen. Phase transitions in a two-parameter model of opin-
ion dynamics with random kinetic exchanges. Physical Review E,
83(1):016108, 2011.
[15] Serge Galam. Minority opinion spreading in random geometry. The Eu-
ropean Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems,
25(4):403-406, 2002.
[16] Serge Galam. From 2000 bushgore to 2006 italian elections: voting at
fifty-fifty and the contrarian effect. Quality & quantity, 41(4):579-589,
2007.
[17] Marcelo A Pires, Andr L Oestereich, and Nuno Crokidakis. Sud-
den transitions in coupled opinion and epidemic dynamics with vac-
cination. Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment,
2018(5):053407, 2018.
17
[18] H Eugene Stanley. Phase transitions and critical phenomena. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1971.
18
